

meaning an image has, it has this meaning 'not independently as its own but only in reference to something else' (Cherniss 59 = 374).

One final aspect of the construction of the clause deserves some clarification: the negative οὐδέ. Most interpreters, if they take notice of it at all, give it the climactic sense of 'not even'.²³ According to Cook Wilson and Cherniss,²⁴ it implies that the clause αὐτὸ τοῦτο κτλ. denies something that might have been expected to be true. But it is also possible to account for the negative along different lines. Denniston²⁵ discusses the use of οὐδέ in causal or explanatory clauses and sentences in which the logical relationship is inverted in such a way that a negative idea which is logically prior to another is presented instead as posterior to it. Cf. e.g. *Prm.* 137e6–138a1: Οὕτε ἄρα εὐθὺ οὔτε περιφερές ἐστιν [sc. τὸ ἐν], ἐπεὶπερ οὐδέ μέρη ἔχει (cited by Denniston). Here, οὐδέ represents the logically prior negative idea 'does not have parts' as posterior to the negative idea 'is neither straight nor circular'. That is, instead of saying 'since it does not have parts, it is neither straight nor circular, either', Plato says 'it is neither straight nor circular, since it does not have parts either'. Cf. also *Alc.* 1 132d1–3, likewise cited by Denniston: 'Εγὼ σοι φράσω, ὃ γε ὑποπτεύω λέγειν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἡμῖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα [sc. γνώθι σεαυτόν]. κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐδέ πολλαχού εἶναι παράδειγμα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον. Here, too, the logically prior negative idea 'there is not much evidence' is represented as posterior to the negative idea 'I am not certain what the inscription means'. (The latter negative, moreover, is merely implicit in the sentence as positively formulated—ὑποπτεύω.) A similar process of inversion is, I suggest, at work in *Ti.* 52c2–5. Here, an image's coming to be *in* something else (ἐν ἐτέρῳ τινὶ γίγνεσθαι) is treated implicitly as a negative notion ('to come to be in something else, not in itself') which, logically speaking, is consequent upon its being (as the ἐπεὶπερ-clause says) an image *of* something else. Yet, by the idiom in question, οὐδέ represents the ἐπεὶπερ-clause instead as logically posterior ('since an image is not, either, the very thing which it refers to etc.').

Ti. 52c2–5, then, means: 'that for an image, since it is not, in relation to itself, that very thing with reference to which it has come to be (i.e. that it signifies), but is an ever-moving apparition²⁶ of something else, it is proper (not) to come to be (in itself, either, but) in something else'.

Decatur, GA

G. J. PENDRICK

²³ For this sense cf. J. D. Denniston, *Greek Particles*² (Oxford, 1954), p. 196.

²⁴ Cf. Cook Wilson (n. 12), 109 and Cherniss 53, 54 = 368, 369.

²⁵ Denniston (n. 23), 195; cf. the similar use of καί (ibid. 295–6).

²⁶ On the sense of φάντασμα here cf. Cherniss 59 n. 7 = 374 n. 7.

A NEW PYTHAGOREAN FRAGMENT AND HOMER'S TEARS IN ENNIUS

Schol. Hom. *Π* 857 a, IV pp. 310–11 Erbse a.¹ Πυθαγόρας φησὶν ὡς ἀναχωροῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνῳ γίνεται, {ἐν} ᾧ ἂν γεννομένῳ σώματι ἡ φυτῷ καταντήσῃ. λυπείται οὖν ὡς ἀκμάζον ἕως αὖ σώμα καὶ δεδοικυῖα, μὴ ποτε ἀναξίῳ περιπέσῃ. πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὖν συγκαλεῖ λέγων ὡς τὰ γενναῖα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ψυχῇ <καταλείπουσα θρηνεῖ>. T; a.² λυπείται ἡ ψυχὴ, μὴ ποτε ἀνάξια πράξασα ἑαυτῆς ἀναξίως περιπέσῃ καὶ ὅτι σώμα ἑὰ ἀκμάζον. ὁ δὲ Πυθαγόρας κακῶς φησι ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τὸ ἐξελθεῖν εἰς φυτὰ τινα καὶ σώματα καὶ θάμνους

μεταβάλλεται, **b** (BCE³) ὄθεν καὶ λελύπηται. πρὸς ἀρετὴν δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ ποιητῆς συγκαλεῖ, μὴ ποτε κακὰ διαπραξάμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς περιπέσωμεν. **b** (BE³)

Although we do not know the philosophical source these scholia¹ derive from (Erbse very plausibly suggested Porphyry; I would argue for the *De regressu animae*²), there can hardly be any doubt that we have here a new Pythagorean fragment³ which communicates basic notions about metempsychosis. Pythagoras is criticized for representing the soul as afflicted by pain and grief (λυπείται, θρηνεῖ) when it leaves the body before entering a new one. The reasons given for its distress need not detain us here, but this new Pythagorean fragment clearly offers a conclusive solution to the vexed question of Homer's tears in Ennius, alluded to in Lucretius 1.120ff.

etsi praeterea tamen esse Acherusia templa
Ennius aeternis exponit versibus edens,
quo neque permanent animae neque corpora nostra,
sed quaedam simulacra modis pallentia miris.
unde sibi exortam semper florentis Homeri
commemorat speciem lacrimas effundere salsas
coepisse et rerum naturam expandere dictis.

Skutsch demonstrated that joy cannot be the cause of Homer's tears, since 'Lucretius had no reason to mention the tears if they were tears of joy';⁴ moreover, comparison with an important fragment of Callimachus' *Hecale* (ἀλυκὸν δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε δάκρυ⁵) makes it clear that *salsas* rules out any suggestion of joy. But what is the cause of the grief that Homer's tears express? A great variety of answers have been proposed, but the new Pythagorean fragment offers the only convincing solution to the problem, with its powerful depiction of the soul's anguish as it leaves its previous abode to undergo the pain of rebirth. During its new birth, Homer's *species* sheds bitter tears because ἀκμάζον ἐῷσα σῶμα καὶ δεδοικυῖα, μὴ ποτε ἀναξίῳ περιπέσει: this is at once a solemn tribute⁶ paid to the unsurpassed greatness of Homer's poetry by one who styles himself Homer's worthy Latin successor, and a

¹ These exegetical scholia ought to explain why Patroclus' soul sheds tears (ὄν πότμον γούωσα) as it flies towards Hades (πταμένη Αἰδόςδε βεβήκει), but their tantalizing structure implies a less mutilated source in which the topic 'wailing souls' was traced through a wide range of texts, including Pythagorean metempsychosis.

² But the author of *Vita Pythagorae* might have dealt with the topic elsewhere: *Contra Boethum de anima* (s. Porfirio, *Vangelo di un pagano* [Milan, 1993], pp. 136–77) or *Quaestiones Homericae* are further possibilities. Porphyry's criticism may have been prompted by the naturalistic notion of a wailing soul.

³ Omitted by both Diels-Kranz and M. Timpanaro Cardini, whose invaluable editions could not take into account the huge corpus of ancient Homeric scholarship. Cf. R. Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian* (University of California, 1986), pp. 36–7.

⁴ *The Annals of Q. Ennius*, ed. with introd. and comm. by O. Skutsch (Oxford, 1985), p. 156. A new assessment of the whole *vexatissima quaestio* is given in E. Livrea, 'Ennio e le lacrime di Omero', *RFIC* 118 (1990), 32–42 = *Studia Hellenistica* I (Florence, 1991), pp. 251–8.

⁵ Fr. 313 Pfeiffer = 57 Hollis, discussed by E. Livrea, *KPECCONA BACKANIHC. Quindici studi di poesia ellenistica* (Florence, 1993), pp. 25–6. On the relevance of Callimachus ('of whose περίπυστον ὄνειρα he cannot possibly be unaware', Skutsch, p. 148, rightly) in Ennius see now E. Livrea, 'Callimaco', fr. 114 Pf., il *Somnium* ed il *Prologo degli Aitia*, *Hermes* 123 (1995), 47–62.

⁶ A most important parallel would confirm the new interpretation. In the second prologue of his 'Homeric' poem (*Ann.* 211–12 Skutsch *nec quisquam sapiam, sapientia quae perhibetur, | in somnis uidit prius quam sam discere coepit*) Ennius extols his achievement as *dicti studiosus*, which makes him a worthy heir of epic traditions. Of course, here *sophia* is used in the Hellenistic sense of 'poetry'; cf. Call. fr. 1.18, *Ep.* 46 Pfeiffer and already Sol. fr. 1.51–2 Gentili-Prato, Pind. *O.* 1.116, 9.38. *P.* 1.12 etc.

forceful representation of supernatural labour pains, which evidently recalls genuine Pythagorean imagery. Two certain conclusions may be drawn:⁷ first, we have here an authentic gem preserved in the obscurity of a neglected Homeric scholium;⁸ second, we should elucidate Ennius by reference to Pythagoras rather than by clinging to the dogmatic assertions of blinkered pedantry.

Università degli Studi di Firenze

ENRICO LIVREA

md5761@mclink.it

⁷ After a series of attacks (*RFIC* 119 [1991], 5–43; *RFIC* 121 [1993], 101–9; *Belfagor* 51 [1996], 76–9; *Paideia* 51 [1996], 229–41), Sebastiano Timpanaro seeks to deny independent value to the new *testimonium*, thus forgetting (1) that ‘diffidenza verso testimonianze tarde’ is not allowed by editors of Pythagorean fragments, cf. e.g. Cardini’s quotations of Iamblichus (fifty-three times!), Porphyry (thirty times!), and Proclus (nineteen times!) as primary sources; and (2) that the Homeric *scholia exegetica* ‘originem traxisse ab exemplis, quae e commentariis primo ante Chr. n. saeculo compositis pendebant’ (Erbse I, p. 13). Timpanaro now informs us (*Paideia*, 236) that he has given up his tears-of-joy dogma, thus jettisoning the sixty-three pages he devoted to the subject. *Quid plura?*

⁸ I disinterred it in ‘Riflessioni di uno psicopatico. *Somnia Pythagorea* o allucinazioni?’, *Da Callimaco a Nonno. Dieci studi di poesia ellenistica* (Florence, 1995), pp. 74–100. Giovanni Pascoli’s old statement (*Epos*² p. L) only goes to show that a great poet’s intuition and sound classical scholarship may sometimes reach the same conclusions by very different routes.

A TRAGIC FRAGMENT IN CICERO, *PRO CAELIO* 67?

It is appropriate that this speech should be full of quotations from Roman drama. These offered the jurymen some compensation for their enforced absence from the theatrical performances of the Ludi Megalenses; on the very day (4 April 56 B.C.) when Cicero demolished Clodia’s reputation in court, her brother Clodius, as curule aedile, was nearby presiding at the opening of the Ludi.¹ Brother and sister both had a strong interest in the stage; in *Pro Sestio* 116² Clodius is described as ‘ipse ille maxime ludius, non solum spectator sed actor et acroama, qui omnia sororis embolia novit’.³ In *Pro Caelio* 18 Cicero takes up Crassus’ quotation of Ennius’ *Medea*, ‘utinam ne in nemore Pelio . . .’ and ends by calling Clodia ‘the Medea of the Palatine’.⁴ Clodius is made to address his sister in a trochaic septenarius, ‘quid clamorem exorsa verbis parvam rem magnam facis?’.⁵ A harsh parent is represented by a quotation from Caecilius,⁶ a gentle one by Micio from Terence’s *Adelphoe*.⁷

¹ For the date, see R. G. Austin, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Pro M. Caelio Oratio*³ (Oxford, 1960), Appendix IV; T. P. Wiseman, ‘Clodius at the theatre’, in *Cinna the Poet and other Roman Essays* (Leicester, 1974), pp. 159–69.

² Quoted by Wiseman, *Catullus and his World: a Reappraisal* (Cambridge, 1985), p. 27 (‘Nobilium Ludi’).

³ R. G. M. Nisbet suspects an indecent pun here. For the company kept by Clodia, see Nisbet, *Collected Papers* (Oxford, 1995), p. 398.

⁴ This was not the only reference to the Argonautic myth in this trial; Atratinus called Caelius ‘pulchellulum Iasonem’, and was himself cast as ‘Pelias cincinnatus’ by Caelius (see Austin on 18.6 ‘Palatinam Medeam’ and Wiseman [n. 2 above], p. 77).

⁵ *Pro Caelio* 36.

⁶ *Pro Caelio* 37, quoting Caecilius 224–35 Warmington (*Remains of Old Latin* I, pp. 546–8).

⁷ *Pro Caelio* 38, quoting *Adelphoe* 120–1. For quotations from early Latin poetry in Cicero’s speeches of 56–54 B.C. see D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Selected Classical Papers* (Michigan, 1997), pp. 179–80 (in an article reprinted from *ICS* 8 [1983], 239–49, where the paragraph appears on pp. 242–3).